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Our fMRI study compares the neural correlates of face-based mindreading in healthy individuals with
an empathizing (n=12) versus systemizing cognitive style (n=12). The empathizing group consists of
individuals that score high on empathizing and low on systemizing, while the systemizing group consists
of individuals with an opposite cognitive pattern. We hypothesize that the empathizing group will show
stronger simulation-type neural activity (e.g., in mirror neuron areas, medial prefrontal cortex, anterior
cingulate cortex) or simulation-related neural activity (e.g., in areas involved in perspective taking and
experiential processing) compared to the systemizing group. As hypothesized, our study reveals that
the empathizing group shows signiﬁcantly stronger activity in mirror neuron areas of the brain, such as
the left inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobe, and in temporal areas involved in perspective
taking and autobiographical memory. Moreover, the empathizing group, but not the systemizing group,
shows activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex which have been related
to simulation-type neural activity in the brain and are central to mindreading. Also, the systemizing
group shows signiﬁcantly stronger activity in the left parahippocampal gyrus. In conclusion, both the
empathizing and systemizing individuals show simulation-type and simulation-related neural activity
during face-basedmindreading. However,more neural activity indicative of simulation-based processing
is seen in the empathizing individuals, while more neural activity indicative of non-simulation-based
systeprocessing is seen in the
. Introduction
During the last decade, several cognitive neuroscience studies
ave provided evidence in favor of simulation theory (ST) accounts
f mindreading [22,23,27,48,57]. ST accounts claim that mindread-
ng involves imagining how the world looks from someone else’s
erspective. The mindreader simulates the mental world of the tar-
et (i.e., evokes a similar experiential and/or psychological state)
nd links this simulated state toacorrespondingmental state,which
an then be accessed by means of introspection and attributed to
he target [27].
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361-9230/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
oi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2010.08.008mizing individuals.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Simulation-type neural activity implies common activation in
a given brain area (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex for introspection
and theory of mind) or in single cells (e.g., mirror neurons in the
inferior frontal gyrus) for both self-aspects and other-aspects of
certain cognitive tasks. Common activation in single cells is also
referred to as mirroring simulation. Common activation in a given
brainarea thatdoesnot involve single cells ormirrorneurons (MNs)
is referred to as non-mirroring simulation (see [28]). Non-mirroring
simulation implies that one subset of neurons in a given brain area
codes for the self-aspect of a particular cognitive task, and another
subset of neurons for the other-aspect [16]. Neural activity in areas
of the brain that contribute to simulation-based mindreading but
do not involve common activation (either in a given brain area
or single cells), can be described as simulation-related rather than
simulation-type (e.g., areas involved in autobiographical memory,
and perspective taking).
According to Goldman [27], face-based mindreading relies
on simulation-type neural activity. Evidence in favor of such
simulation-typeneural activityduring face-basedemotion recogni-
tion is provided in a study by Carr et al. [9] on face-based imitation.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
n Minimum Maximum M SD
Systemizing group
SQ 12 40 59 47.83 6.09
EQ 12 12 43 30.83 8.42F. Focquaert et al. / Brain Res
arr et al.’s [9] results indicate that an action-mirroring mecha-
ism (i.e., the human mirror neuron system (MNS)) is implicated
n face-based emotion recognition. The observation and imitation
f emotional faces elicited common activation in the premotor face
rea, the dorsal inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the superior temporal
ulcus (STS), the insula and amygdala. Moreover, several imaging
tudies on implicit mindreading (i.e., no overt mental state attri-
ution is involved) have shown that self-reported empathy (or an
empathizing’ cognitive style) correlateswith simulation-type neu-
al activity (e.g., [35,44,61]). Schulte-Rüther et al. [60] report the
ame ﬁnding for explicit mindreading skills (i.e., involving overt
ental state attribution). Schulte-Rüther et al. [60] argue that their
ndings support theviewthatMNmechanismsoperateduring self-
nd other-related decoding of emotional face expressions. Inter-
stingly, a study by Cheng et al. [10] showed that empathizing
kills correlate positivelywithMNactivity, while systemizing skills
orrelate negatively with MN activity.
Goldman [27] asserts that simulation is the default strategy for
ace-based mindreading in all normal individuals. Drawing upon
he ﬁndings from the above studies, we wanted to investigate
hether these simulation-based processes differ in empathizing
ersus systemizing individuals during explicitmindreading.Hence,
o further elucidate the neural correlates of mindreading in normal
ndividuals, the current fMRI study compares individuals with an
mpathizing cognitive style (i.e., highempathizing and lowsystem-
zing) to individuals with a systemizing cognitive style (i.e., low
mpathizing and high systemizing) during face-based mindread-
ng. This is the ﬁrst fMRI study investigating the difference between
mpathizing and systemizing cognitive styles during mindread-
ng. We hypothesize that the empathizing group will show more
ctivity indicative of simulation-type and/or simulation-related
rocessing (in line with ST), such as MN activity in the IFG and infe-
ior parietal lobule (IPL), non-mirroring simulation-type activity in
he medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex
ACC), and simulation-related activity in the temporal lobes known
o be involved in autobiographical memory and perspective taking.
. Materials and methods
.1. Questionnaires
.1.1. Empathy questionnaire (EQ)
The EQ [6] is a validated 60-item (40 assessing empathy and 20 ﬁller control)
easure assessing empathy. Responses are given on a 4-point-Likert scale ranging
rom strongly disagree to strongly agree. Responses were scored in the suggested
anner, with participants receiving 0 for a ‘non-empathic’ response, 1 for a some-
hat empathic and 2 for a very empathic response (e.g., for item 25: strongly agree
ets 2 points, agree gets 1 point, and disagree and strongly disagree both get 0
oints; or for item 46: strongly disagree gets 2 points, disagree gets 1 point, and
gree and strongly agree both get 0 points). The total possible score is 80. Empathiz-
ng can be deﬁned as “the drive to identify another’s mental states and to respond to
hese with an appropriate emotion, in order to predict and to respond to the behav-
or of another person” ([3], p. 820). Unless an individual has a pathologically high
evel of empathy, individuals with high empathizing skills typically feel comfort-
ble in social settings, can easily relate to others and are able to form close, lasting
elationships with others. These individuals are very socially sensitive. In contrast,
ndividuals with low empathizing typically feel uncomfortable during social set-
ings, have difﬁculty understanding others’ thoughts and feelings, and often ﬁnd it
ifﬁcult to establish andmaintain social relationships.Women typically scorehigher
n the EQ compared to men [1].
.1.2. Systemizing questionnaire (SQ)
The SQ [4] is a validated 60-item (40 assessing systemizing and 20 ﬁller con-
rol) measure assessing systemizing. Responses are given on a 4-point-Likert scale
anging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Responses were scored in the sug-
ested manner, with participants receiving 0 for a ‘non-systemizing’ response, 1 for
somewhat systemizing response, and 2 for a very systemizing response (e.g., for
tem 19: strongly agree gets 2 points, agree gets 1 point, and disagree and strongly
isagree both get 0 points; or for item 31: strongly disagree gets 2 points, disagree
ets 1 point, and agree and strongly agree both get 0 points). The total possible score
s 80. Systemizing can be deﬁned as “the drive to analyze a system in terms of the
ules that govern the system, in order to predict the behavior of the system” ([3], p.Empathizing group
SQ 12 10 38 27.92 8.91
EQ 12 36 70 47.00 11.86
820). Individuals that score high on systemizing are good at understandingmechan-
ical systems and input–output relations in general. They have the ability to focus
on relevant details and ignore irrelevant ones. They are often engineers or scientists
[20]. Individualswith low systemizing skills are typically less good at understanding
mechanical systems, input–output relations. Men typically score higher on the SQ
compared to women [1].
2.1.3. ‘Revised reading the mind in the eyes’ test
This test is a validated advanced theory of mind test involving complex mental
states (e.g., social emotions). It is designed to check how well participants can ‘tune
in’ to others’ thoughts and feelings. The participants are presentedwith a series of 36
photographs of eyes and are asked to choosewhichword (out of four) best describes
what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling [1,7]. In the present fMRI
study, participants are asked to choose between two words (see below).
2.2. Participants
Twenty-four male volunteers (mean age=27 years, range 18–38 years) were
recruited from the Dartmouth student and post-doc pool in mathematics, physics,
chemistry, computer science, engineering, environmental science, theatre, etc.
(N=137). Participants were screened using the empathy questionnaire (EQ) and
systemizing questionnaire (SQ) [1]. Participants were paid $10 per hour for their
participation in the behavioral part and informed consent was obtained in accor-
dance with the guidelines set forth by the Dartmouth Committee for the Protection
of Human Subjects (CHPS protocol #17772). We selected two groups of 12 par-
ticipants each that differed in their empathizing-systemizing cognitive style (see
Table 1). One group had high systemizing combined with low empathizing (i.e., sys-
temizing group), and the other group displayed an opposite pattern of high or above
average empathizing combined with low systemizing (i.e., empathizing group). On
the SQ, most normal men score about 30 out of 80, whereas on the EQ most normal
men score about 42 out of 80 (for ranges see [1]).
All participantswere right-handed, had normal visual acuity, andwere screened
for history of psychiatric or medical illness. All participants were male to make
sure that gender biases in emotional recognition and empathic processing did not
confound our ﬁndings [1,42]. Participants were paid $10 per hour or given T-points
for their participation in the imaging study andgave informed consent in accordance
with the guidelines set forth by the Dartmouth Committee for the Protection of
Human Subjects.
2.3. Stimuli and experimental design
All stimuli were shown using NeuroBehavioral Systems Presentation 9.9
(http://www.neurobs.com/) software and consisted of 36 photographs that were
part of the ‘Revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test [1,7]. The ‘Reading the Mind
in the Eyes’ test [2] was previously used in an fMRI study to compare normal indi-
viduals to individuals with Asperger syndrome [5]. Baron-Cohen et al. [5] used a
force choice task between two words that either indicated an emotional content
or the exact opposite of this emotional content. For example, their test used “con-
cerned” versus “unconcerned” ([5], p. 1893) as a forced choice option. Since our
participants were all graduate students and might not have been motivated by the
relatively easy Baron-Cohen et al. [5] version, we opted for a slightly altered ver-
sion of the ‘Revised Mind in the Eyes’ test. Participants could choose between two
options with varying emotional content. For example, our test used “hostile” versus
“preoccupied.”Wedecided not to include four options, since thismight generate too
much eye movement on behalf of the participants and result in overlapping frontal
activations that might compromise our results. The false options were randomly
chosen from the behavioral ‘RevisedMind in the Eyes’ test consisting of four options
each [1].
A blocked CACBCA. . . design was used. Both task A (control) and task B
(face-based mindreading) consisted of a forced choice between two words (either
male/female or a choice between two words depicting various mental states). Par-
ticipantswere asked to indicate their response bymeans of button presses (pressing
one of two buttons with the right hand and choosing between the right word and
the left word). Correct words were counterbalanced across the right and the left
side. During task A, participants were shown 36 photographs of eyes and asked to
indicate the gender of the individuals in the photograph. Stimuli were shown for
5.25 s followed by an ISI of .75 s. During task B, participants saw the same stimuli
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ndwere asked to indicatewhich of twowords best described the facial expressions
isplayed in the photographs. Again, stimuli were shown for 5.25 s. followed by an
SI of .75 s. Task A and B each lasted for 36 s, during which time 6 photographs were
rojected to the subjects, and were alternated with a baseline condition (task C)
onsisting of a crosshair that lasted for 15 s. Participants were asked to ﬁxate on the
rosshair whenever it appeared. Each functional run consisted of 7 rest/crosshair
onditions of 15 s each and 6 task conditions of 36 s each. Each functional run began
nd endedwith a 15 s rest/crosshair condition andwas alternatedwith a task condi-
ion throughout the run, thus the blocks ran as rest, task, rest, task, etc. Previous lab
esearch has shown that subjects start to move, become bored, fall asleep, etc. when
ndividual functional sessions extend beyond go 5–6min. We divided up functional
uns to account for this. There were two functional runs that were alternated across
articipants (see Fig. 1).
. Data collection
.1. Image acquisition
Imaging was performed on a 3Tesla Phillips Scanner using a
ENSE head coil for signal reception. fMRI was performed using
radient echo, EPI. Two functional runs (eachprecededby two lead-
n dummy scans) were collected consisting of 107 volumes each
ith the following parameters used: TR=3000ms, TE=35ms, ﬂip
ngle =90◦, FOV=240mm, matrix =80×80×30; and slice thick-
ess =4mm, skip .5mm. Functional runs were randomized across
ubjects. 3D-high resolution sagittal imageswere collected for each
ubject using the followingparameters: TR=9.9ms, TE=4.6ms, ﬂip
ngle =8◦, FOV=240mm, matrix =256×256×160 and slice thick-
ess =1mm..2. fMRI data preprocessing
Data preprocessing was performed using FMRI Expert Analysis
ool (FEAT) Version 5.63, which is part of FSL (FMRIB’s Softwarerimental design.
Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) [62]. Each subject completed two
fMRI runs and the following pre-statistical processing was applied
to each run.Motion correctionwas appliedusing themiddle scan as
reference; images were slice-timing corrected and spatial smooth-
ing was applied using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm and
mean-based intensity normalization of all volumes performed by
the same factor.
Registration to stereotaxic MNI space was carried out using
FLIRT [37,36]. Time-series statistical analysis was carried out using
FILMprewhiteningwith local autocorrelationcorrection [66];high-
pass temporal ﬁltering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight
line ﬁtting, with sigma=102 s). The ﬁrst and second runs for each
subject were combined using ﬁxed effects model, by forcing the
random effects variance to zero in FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed
Effects (FLAME). BOLD responses were assumed to be uniform
across brain areas and subjects and were modeled by a 36 s box-car
for the gender and mindreading conditions. Parameter estimates
from the design matrix were generated for each subject’s time-
series data for the task conditions and rest conditions. Six motion
parameters were also included in the design matrix. Contrasts of
parameter estimates were generated for the following conditions
in each subject: gender >mindreading; mindreading>gender. Z-
statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined by
Z>2.3 and a corrected cluster signiﬁcance threshold of p= .05 [67].
In order to determine differential activations between the sys-
temizing and empathizing group, within group activation maps
for gender >mindreading and gender <mindreading were exam-
ined using independent sample t-tests with the ﬁxed effects model
described above and subjects as a random factor. To ensure that
difference maps were not showing statistically signiﬁcant nega-
tive activation differences, all higher-level contrasts of parameter
estimates were constrained by masks containing Z-scores greater
earch Bulletin 83 (2010) 214–222 217
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Table 2
Differential contrast analysis.
Brain regions BA x y za
1. Mindreading>gender
Empathizing
Temporal lobes
L middle temporal gyrus 21 −59 −52 6
Frontal lobes
L inferior frontal gyrus 44 −55 18 16
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 −53 26 6
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 −51 29 −3
L medial frontal gyrus 9 −4 35 33
L superior frontal gyrus 6 0 17 60
L superior frontal gyrus 10 −8 60 25
Limbic system
L cingulate gyrus 32 −8 18 40
Systemizing
Temporal lobes
L middle temporal gyrus 21 −61 −46 8
L middle temporal gyrus 22 −53 −39 −1
L superior temporal gyrus 22 −57 −52 10
Frontal lobes
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 −53 18 19
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 −46 27 −10
2. Mindreading>gender
Empathizing > systemizing
Frontal lobes
L precentral gyrus 44 −53 10 9
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 −53 35 2
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 −50 25 −1
Temporal lobes
R middle temporal gyrus 21 63 −50 3
R middle temporal gyrus 22 59 −47 2
R middle temporal gyrus 39 51 −66 11
L middle temporal gyrus 21 −59 −52 6
L middle temporal gyrus 19 −55 −61 16
L middle temporal gyrus 37 −51 −60 0
L middle temporal gyrus 39 −42 −52 14
R superior temporal gyrus 22 50 −46 15
L superior temporal gyrus 22 −42 −52 17
L fusiform gyrus 37 −40 −57 −14
L fusiform gyrus 37 −40 −63 −12
R fusiform gyrus 18 28 −85 −23
R fusiform gyrus 19 26 −82 −14
Parietal lobes
L inferior parietal lobule 40 −63 −40 24
L supramarginal gyrus 40 −65 −49 23
Systemizing > empathizing
Temporal lobes
L middle temporal gyrus 21 −59 −22 −6
L superior temporal gyrus 38 −57 11 −17
Frontal lobes
R superior frontal gyrus 6 4 14 56
L superior frontal gyrus 6 −2 28 58
L superior frontal gyrus 6 0 7 57
L middle frontal gyrus 47 −48 48 −9
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 −51 46 −14
Cortical
L parahippocampal gyrus 27 −20 −31 −7
Note: All results of unpaired t-test signiﬁcant at p< .05, cluster-level corrected.F. Focquaert et al. / Brain Res
han 0. Post hoc region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed
y masking between group Z-stat differential contrasts (mindread-
ng>gender) with a Brodmann area mask. The ROIs were deﬁned
rom within the WFU Pickatlas Matlab program, using Brodmann
reas from stereotaxic space (see [49]) and then thresholding
npaired t-test results atp= .005 (uncorrected). The speciﬁc regions
f interest were chosen based upon recent fMRI studies on implicit
ace-based mindreading which show that higher empathizing cor-
elates with more activity in MN-areas and MN-related areas (IFG,
PL, STS, anterior insula (AI)) [9,35,44].
. Results
.1. Behavioral results
.1.1. Revised Mind in the Eyes and gender recognition
Bothgroups scoredsigniﬁcantlyabovechanceonboth tasksdur-
ng scanning. The empathizing group (gender: M=97%, SD=2.8)
nd systemizing group (gender: M=96%, SD=3.2) scored compa-
able on the gender task. The empathizing group (mindreading:
=90%, SD=5.6) was more accurate than the systemizing group
mindreading: M=82%, SD=7.2) on the mindreading task. A one-
ay ANOVA was obtained, revealing a signiﬁcant effect of group
empathizing vs. systemizing) for the mindreading task, with the
mpathizing group performing better than the systemizing group
F(1, 22) =8.84, p< .01), but no signiﬁcant effect of group for the
ender task (F(1, 22) = .57, n.s.).
.2. fMRI results
.2.1. Differential contrast analysis
In the remainder of the paper, mindreading>gender refers to
he comparison between the mindreading and the gender task
n terms of brain activity; empathizing refers to the empathiz-
ng group; systemizing refers to the systemizing group; and
mpathizing > systemizing refers to the comparison between the
mpathizing and the systemizing group in terms of brain activity,
nd vice versa for systemizing> empathizing.
.2.1.1. systemizing: mindreading > gender. The systemizing group
hows signiﬁcant BOLD responses in the left middle/superior tem-
oral gyrus (BA 21, 22) and the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45,
7) during the face-based mindreading task (Table 2).
.2.1.2. empathizing: mindreading > gender. The empathizing
roup shows signiﬁcant BOLD responses in the left middle tempo-
al gyrus (BA 21), the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44, 45, 47), the
eft medial frontal gyrus (BA 9), the left superior frontal gyrus (BA
, 10) and the left cingulate gyrus (BA 32) during the face-based
indreading task (Table 2).
.2.1.3. systemizing > empathizing: mindreading > gender. Our anal-
sis reveals signiﬁcantly stronger BOLD responses in the left
iddle/superior temporal gyrus (BA 21, 22), the left temporal pole
BA 38), the right superior frontal gyrus (BA 6), the left mid-
le/inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) and the left parahippocampal
yrus (BA 27) in the systemizing group (Table 2, Fig. 2).
.2.1.4. empathizing > systemizing: mindreading > gender. Our anal-
sis reveals signiﬁcantly stronger BOLD responses in the left
nferior frontal gyrus (BA 44, 45, 47), the bilateral superior tem-
oral gyri (BA 22), the bilateral middle temporal gyri (BA 21, 22),
he bilateral angular gyrus (BA 39), the left inferior parietal lob-
le/supramarginal gyrus (BA40), and in the bilateral fusiformgyrus
BA 18, 19, 37) in the empathizing group (Table 2, Fig. 3).BA=Brodmann’s area; L = left, R = right.
a Cluster peak in MNI coordinates.
Local maxima in multiple regions (BA) with the highest Z-score within the cluster
are reported.
4.2.2. ROI analysis (mindreading > gender)
The ROI analysis (see Table 3, Fig. 4) reveals signiﬁcantly
stronger BOLD responses in the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA
44), left superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), bilateral middle tem-
poral gyrus (BA 21, 22) and the left inferior parietal lobule (BA
40) in the empathizing group (empathizing > systemizing: min-
218 F. Focquaert et al. / Brain Research Bulletin 83 (2010) 214–222
Fig. 2. Differential contrast analysis; systemizing> empathizing:mindreading>gender. Legend: The results are displayed on a 3D rendered brain averaged from all subjects in
the study. The areas showing signiﬁcantly stronger activation during face-based mindreading in the systemizing group. Images are in neurological convention. Right = right.
Left = left. RH activation: BA 6. LH activation: BA 21, BA 38, BA 47, BA 27.
Fig. 3. Differential contrast analysis; empathizing > systemizing:mindreading>gender. Legend: The results are displayed on a 3D rendered brain averaged from all subjects in
the study. The areas showing signiﬁcantly stronger activation during face-based mindreading in the empathizing group. Images are in neurological convention. Right = right.
Left = left. LH activation: BA 44, BA 45, BA 47, and BA 40. Bilateral activation: BA 22, BA 21, BA 39, BA 18, BA 19 and BA 37.
Table 3
ROI analysis.
Brain region: mindreading > gender BA x y za No. of voxels Maximum Z-score
Empathizing > systemizing
L inferior frontal gyrus 44 −54 10 10 218 6.28
L inferior parietal lobule 40 −64 −38 34 1579 5.99
R middle temporal gyrus 21 64 −54 0 1064 5.99
R middle temporal gyrus 22 60 −48 2 861 5.34
L middle temporal gyrus 21 −62 −54 −2 1032 4.79
L superior temporal gyrus 22 −60 −62 12 842 5.45
Systemizing > empathizing
L inferior frontal gyrus 44
R inferior parietal lobule 40
R superior temporal gyrus 21 62 −24 −4 1064 5.16
R middle temporal gyrus 22
L middle temporal gyrus 21 −62 −18 −12 1032 6.64
−4
N n’s ar
d
r
g
i
n
5
5
eL superior temporal gyrus 22 −66
ote: All results of unpaired t-test signiﬁcant at p= .005, uncorrected. BA=Brodman
a Peak statistical height in MNI coordinates.
reading>gender). Signiﬁcantly stronger BOLD responses in the
ight and left superior temporal (BA 22) and left middle temporal
yrus (BA 21) are found in the systemizing group (systemiz-
ng>empathizing: mindreading>gender) (Table 3, Fig. 4). We did
ot ﬁnd insula differences.
. Discussion.1. Main ﬁndings
Our study investigates whether normal individuals with an
mpathizing versus systemizing cognitive style differ in terms of8 10 842 5.15
ea; L = left, R = right.
simulation-based neural processes during face-based mindread-
ing. Even though all our participants are normal individuals
matched in terms of gender, age, education and socio-economical
background, our study reveals signiﬁcant differences in brain activ-
ity between the systemizing group and the empathizing group.
Behaviorally, although both groups perform highly above chance,
the empathizing group performs better than the systemizing
group.
Brieﬂy summarizing our main BOLD results: the general anal-
ysis reveals signiﬁcantly stronger activity in the left IFG (BA 44),
bilateral STG (BA 22), the left IPL (BA 40), the bilateral TPJ (BA 39)
and the bilateral fusiform gyrus (FG; BA 19, 37) in the empathizing
F. Focquaert et al. / Brain Research Bulletin 83 (2010) 214–222 219
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sig. 4. ROI analysis (mindreading>gender). Legend: The results are displayed on
ng> systemizing; B: LBA 44, empathizing > systemizing; C: RBA 22, empathizing > sy
ight = right. Left = left.
roup. In the systemizing group, our analysis reveals signiﬁcantly
tronger activity in the left temporal pole (TP; BA 38), the right
uperior frontal gyrus (SFG; BA 6), and the left parahippocam-
al gyrus. Moreover, our general analysis shows activity in the
PFC and ACC in the empathizing group but not the systemizing
roup.
.2. The empathizing group
.2.1. MPFC and ACC
The general analysis reveals signiﬁcant activity in the MPFC
BA 9/10) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 32) during the
indreading task in the empathizing group, which is not seen
n the systemizing group. Although the MPFC, ACC, TPJ and TPs
re all deemed important for mindreading, activity in the MPFC
nd ACC is exemplary of simulation-type processing in the brain
19,18,27,57,61].
Singer et al. [61] andMorrison et al. [51] found shared activity in
he ACC for the observation and experience of painful stimuli. Sim-
larly, several fMRI studies indicate that the MPFC is implicated in
oth ﬁrst-person (i.e., introspection and self-reﬂection) and third-
erson mindreading (i.e., theory of mind) (e.g., [48,65]). A study by
chsner et al. [54] shows that the attributionof emotions to self and
ther elicits shared neurological activity in the MPFC. Vogeley et al.
65] similarly found shared prefrontal activation for ﬁrst-person
nd third-person mental state attribution (i.e., mindreading). Gus-
ard et al. [30] and Johnson et al. [38] found MPFC activation for
ntrospective judgments and self-reﬂection. Self-reﬂective thought
ctivated the anterior regions of the MPFC. Reﬂecting upon current
motions also activates this region [30,45]. In a study by Kelley
t al. [40] participants were asked to make judgments about trait
djectives that were either self-relevant, other-relevant or case
udgments. Both the self-condition and the other-condition elicited
hanges in the MPFC. Moreover, Mitchell et al. [50] found activ-
ty in a region of the ventral MPFC that correlated with perceived
elf/other similarity. Last but not least, Frith and Frith [21] mentionrendered brain averaged from all subjects in the study. A: LBA 40, empathiz-
izing; D: RBA 22, systemizing> empathizing. Images are in neurological convention.
that out of 12 mindreading studies that they reviewed, all of them
include MPFC activation.
5.2.2. IFG and IPL
Our ROI analysis reveals stronger activation in the IFG and IPL
in the empathizing group that overlaps with areas of activation in
human MNS studies, both related to studies comparing individuals
with ASCs to normal controls during observation versus imitation
of faces [13,53], as well as studies using normal individuals during
observation versus imitation of faces [8,9,24,47,56] and gestures
[25,29,31,34]. It is important to mention that Carr et al. [9] did
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in activation, both for the observa-
tion and imitation task, between whole face stimuli, mouth only
stimuli and eyes-only stimuli. Possibly, mouth only stimuli and
eyes-only stimuli elicit similar MN activity as whole face stimuli
by means of a triggering process (e.g., observation and imitation
of eyes-only stimuli likely trigger a whole face mimicry pattern;
see [15]).
Overall, our empathizing group activates so-called MN-areas
signiﬁcantly more than our systemizing group, which could imply
that the empathizing group relies more on mirroring simulation.
Recently, Tamietto et al. [64] found evidence in favor of non-
lateralized perceptual processing of social emotions. Hence, the
left-lateralized IFG and IPL differences in the empathizing group,
likely reﬂect differences in emotion experience, rather than emo-
tion perception [52]. However, we must mention that our left IPL
coordinates also correspond to studies that do not involve typical
MNS tasks, suchas reﬂectinguponone’s ownpersonality traits [41],
ﬁrst-person perspective taking/simulation [58], and autobiograph-
ical memory [46]. Hence, instead of possibly being exemplary of
mirroring simulation, the left IPL activation could be exemplary of
non-mirroring simulation.
5.2.3. Temporal lobes
Our ROI analysis reveals stronger activity in the temporal
lobes in the empathizing group that overlaps with areas that are
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mplicated in experiential (i.e., ‘reliving’) autobiographical mem-
ry [12,26], autobiographical memory [17,46], self-knowledge
etrieval [55], perspective taking/simulation [58], emotional face
irroring [60] and imagined emotion attribution [33]. Possibly,
uch autobiographical, perspective taking and experiential activa-
ion patterns in the empathizing group reﬂect simulation-related
rocessing in the brain, in which one’s own (past) experiential
tates contribute to mindreading.
.3. The systemizing group
.3.1. Temporal lobes
Goldman [27] hypothesized that individuals that do not rely on
imulation-type processing during face-based emotion recognition
e.g., individuals with brain damage) might rely on an alterna-
ive ‘theorizing’ method to solve face-based mindreading tasks.
nterestingly, our differential contrast analysis reveals stronger
ctivation in the systemizing group in the left parahippocampal
yruswhichmight reﬂect a theorizing approach to face-basedmin-
reading. The parahippocampal gyrus is involved in recollective
emory and the encoding/retrieval of associations (for a review,
ee [63]), and spatial layout encoding involved in associative pro-
essing particularly [14].
Our ROI analysis further reveals stronger activation in the tem-
oral lobes that is implicated in associative memory for faces [32],
nd associative memory versus autobiographical memory tasks
11]. Purely hypothetically, the activation in these temporal areas
n the systemizing group might account for a more rule-based or
theorizing’ approach to face-based mindreading in which partic-
lar geometric and conﬁgural properties of emotional faces are
elated to particular emotions. A more theorizing-driven approach
ight compensate for reduced simulation-type processing in these
ndividuals. Similar to our hypothesis in the empathizing group,
chulte-Rüther et al. [60]hypothesize that the subjects in their fMRI
tudy “used their own personal past experiences to gain access to
ther persons’ thoughts and emotional states” (p. 1368). It is not
nlikely that the systemizing individuals in our study use their
wn (past) experiential states less, and focus more on speciﬁc facial
onﬁgurations (i.e., a rule-based approach) to solve the face-based
indreading task.
Our results suggest that simulation-based processes are used in
oth our groups, which is in line with Goldman’s [27] view. In line
ith recent fMRI studies [44,61], simulation-based processing does
ppear to be reduced in individuals with low self-reported empa-
hy. Moreover, individuals that are high on systemizing appear
o use non-simulation-based processes more strongly compared
o individuals that score low on self-reported systemizing. Hence,
artially distinct mechanisms for face-based mindreading in nor-
al individuals might exist depending on one’s cognitive style.
e therefore urge future studies to investigate this possibil-
ty.
Although both groups perform very well on the face-based
indreading task, the empathizing individuals score signiﬁcantly
etter than the systemizing individuals. This raises the following
uestion: does stronger simulation lead to better mindreading?
ne potential limitation of this study is the fact that our face-based
indreading task involves eyes-only stimuli. Eyes-only stimuli
ight favor the empathizing group over the systemizing group
egardless of any existing differences in simulation-based process-
ng. In principle, eyes-only stimuli do not obstruct simulation-type
rocessing, since whole face mimicry patterns are triggered by
motional stimuli in general and not just by emotional faces
15]. They might however inﬂuence ‘rule-based’ processing. Eyes-
nly stimuli provide less overt conﬁgural information compared
o whole face stimuli, and thus make the task more difﬁcult
or the systemizing group if they indeed use more ‘rule-based’Bulletin 83 (2010) 214–222
mechanisms during mindreading. On a separate note, a study
by Lahaie et al. [43] found evidence for intact conﬁgural pro-
cessing in individuals with Asperger syndrome – which typically
have very high systemizing and very low empathizing skills
[1] – along with enhanced processing for individual face parts.
Such enhanced processing might compensate for reduced con-
ﬁgural information in normal individuals with high systemizing
skills.
It has also been argued that individualswithAsperger syndrome
process eye/face stimuli differently and that this might, in part, be
due to reduced or absent ﬁxation on the eye region [59]. Hence,
reduced ﬁxation on the eye stimuli could potentially explain the
behavioral difference in our groups. Because our subjects were
normal individuals, reduced ﬁxation on the eye region in the sys-
temizing individuals appears, at least at ﬁrst, to be a less plausible
hypothesis. Moreover, the high scores on the mindreading task in
both groups in our study show that both groups did attend to the
eye stimuli. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the systemiz-
ing groups ﬁxated less on the stimuli compared to the empathizing
group. Indeed, stronger activation in the empathizing group in the
FG potentially argues in favor of the latter hypothesis [39]. In sum,
several hypotheses are possible: either the empathizing group are
better mindreaders due to stronger simulation-based processing
in these individuals compared to the systemizing group, or the
stimulus material slightly disfavored the systemizing group due to
reduced conﬁgural information, or the systemizing group ﬁxated
less on the stimuli compared to the empathizing group resulting
in more false answers. To explore these possibilities, future studies
should compare eyes-only and whole face stimuli, and, if possible,
incorporate eye-tracking data.
6. Conclusion
Face-based mindreading involves simulation-type and
simulation-related neural activity in both empathizing and
systemizing individuals. Importantly however, the empathizing
individuals show more neural activity indicative of simulation-
based processes, while the systemizing individuals show more
neural activity indicative of non-simulation-based processes,
possibly involving stronger rule-based or ‘theorizing’ mecha-
nisms. Normal individuals might have partially distinct neural
mindreading mechanisms depending on their speciﬁc cognitive
style. Moreover, future research should investigate whether or not
stronger simulation leads to better mindreading.
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